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1 Introduction
Over the last five decades, many studies have shown that real exchange rate (RER) plays
a non-negligible role in the economy. For instance, the RER is the key variable in deci-
sions involving the balance of payments (current and capital accounts). It is an important
determinant, through low volatility, of productivity growth. Mismanagement of the RER
has also bad consequences for the economy: high RER appreciations, excessive over-
valuations, large RER volatility can affect investment decisions, undermine households
and firms’ choices, cause balance-of-payments disequilibrium, currency and debt crises,
altogether having damaging effects for productivity, growth and macroeconomic perfor-
mance in general. The RER occupies a central position in trade and exchange policies
between countries and regions around the world.
In the same line of thought as those mentioned above, researchers have examined
the relationship between RER misalignment and economic growth. Razin and Collins
(1997) find that RER misalignment acts nonlinearly on growth. Very large overvalua-
tions seem to have negative effects on growth, whereas moderate under-valuations are
related with very high growth rates. Employing GMM panel data methods, Aguirre
and Calderon (2005) also discover that the effect of misalignment on growth is nonlinear.
High misalignments and large under-valuations hinder growth, while moderate under-
valuations boost the growth rate. Rodrik (2008) demonstrates that RER undervaluation
increases growth in developing countries which predominantly suffer from institutional
weaknesses and product-market failures. The channel through which under-valuation
affects growth is the size of the tradable sector which is hampered by market failures
that prevent developing countries from attaining high GDPs. Berg andMiao (2010) com-
pare the “Washington Consensus” view that stipulates that RER misalignment creates
macroeconomic imbalances that hurt growth to the Rodrik (2008) thesis which defends
that undervaluation is favorable to economic growth. Their central result illustrates that
the “Washington Consensus” view and Rodrik (2008) thesis are mainly the same for the
principal growth regressions Rodrik (2008) presents. But there exist some identification
issues insofar as the determinants of RER misalignment are also, in most cases, the re-
gressors in growth estimations. MacDonald and Vieira (2010) use panel data techniques
to explore the effect of RER misalignment on growth for 90 countries from 1980 to 2004.
2
They extend the Rodrik (2008) approach by including more determinants of RER in the
computation of the misalignment indicator. Their panel data estimation method also
correct for too many instruments using the Hansen-Diff test. Sallenave (2010) examines
the effects of RER misalignment on macroeconomic performance for the G20 countries
from 1980 to 2006. The author finds a negative relationship between RER misalignment
and growth. Elbadawi, Kaltani and Soto (2012) study the link between aid, RER mis-
alignment and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. They discover that aid do not cause RER
overvaluation, aid increases growth but its effect is diminished in countries with high
overvaluations and finally overvaluation hinder growth but its negative impact is atten-
uated by financial development. Mbaye (2012) analyzes the RER undervaluation-growth
nexus for 72 countries over the period 1970-2008. He shows that undervaluation mostly
affects growth through total factor productivity.
Similarly to the works cited above, this paper examines the connection between RER
misalignment and economic growth. It makes several contributions. On the theoretical
front, this paper is the first to introduce a fully-micro-founded endogenous economic
growth model that illustrates the explicit effect of RER on long-run growth. In this study,
we show that RER and taxes have a straight clear effect on growth. This have not been
done before. On the empirical front, the paper has many innovations. First, in the com-
putation of real effective exchange rate (REER) misalignment, we use the Pesaran and
Smith (1995) Mean Group Estimator and we introduce Total Factor Productivity to con-
trol for the Balassa-Samuelson effect instead of real GDP per capita as a proxy. Second,
in the growth regressions, we employ the newly invented Cross-Sectionally Augmented
Distributed Lag Estimator of Chudik, Mohaddes, Pesaran and Raissi (2013). This vari-
able and these estimations techniques have not been used in previous analyzes on the
REER misalignment-growth nexus. The theoretical endogenous growth model demon-
strates that an RER appreciation diminishes growth in the centralized and competitive
economies. The model also shows that taxes act negatively on growth. The econometric
results illustrate that RER misalignment hinders growth in the overall sample and in the
subsamples of developed and developing countries. We also found that taxes are harmful
to growth. These empirical results confirm what was found theoretically. These results
are maintained by using alternative measurements of RER misalignment. Moreover, we
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discovered that very large misalignments have larger damaging effects on growth.
The remaining of the paper is organized in the following manner: the first section
presents the theoretical model, the second section exposes the empirical investigations
and the last part concludes.
4
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we expose the theoretical model and illustrate how the main equations
are obtained.
2.1 Setting the Model
The social planner picks out a consumptionpath thatmaximizes his global utility function
subject to some dynamic and other constraints, and the initial values of capital stocks.
His optimization program is given by 1:
Max{c(t),ivT(t),ivN(t)}U (0) =
∫ ∞
0
(
c (t)1−σ − 1
)
e−ρ t
1 − σ
dt (1)
Subject to:
d
dt
kT (t) = ivT (t) − δ kT (t) (2)
d
dt
kN (t) = ivN (t) − δ kN (t) (3)
y (t) = AkT (t)
α kN (t)
1−α (4)
y (t) = c (t) + ivT (t) + ǫ ivN (t) (5)
And
kT (0) and kN (0) are given
In equation (1),C(t) is consumption, σ−1measures the constant intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, ρ represents the subjective rate of time preference. It is
assumed that both σ and ρ are strictly positive. Equality (2) gives the law of motion of
capital stock in the tradable sector. In this equation, kT (t) is capital in the tradable sector,
ivT (t) is investment for the tradable good and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate
in both sectors. Similarly (3) is the law of motion of capital stock for the non-tradable
good. Its components are defined analogically as in the previous equation. Equation
(4) defines output y (t) as a Cobb-Douglas production function where A is total factor
productivity, α ∈ (0, 1) constitutes the share of tradable capital in the production. The
1To certain extents, the model presented here could be viewed as an extended version of Barro and Sala-i
Martin (2004) model, pp. 240-242.
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production function exhibits Constant Returns to Scale to tradable and non-tradable
capital together. The resource constraint of the economy is represented by equivalence
(5). It says that income equal to consumption c (t) plus both types of investments. The
last two expressions tells us that the initial capital stocks, kT (0) and kN (0), are given.
Now we turn to some more elucidations on the model presented above.
Definition. The internal RER ǫ, in foreign-currency terms, is expressed as the price of non-
tradable goods pN divided by the price of tradable goods pT. An increase in this RER is an
appreciation.
ǫ =
pN
pT
(6)
Assumption 1. We assume that production and consumption are measured in terms of tradables.
We also assume that investment in tradables represent the same good as capital in tradables.
Likewise we suppose that investment in nontradables constitutes the same good as capital in
nontradables. In addition, we assume that all tradables goods represent the same good and all
nontradables also constitute the same good. Finally tradables and nontradables are expressed in
the same monetary unit by multiplying each good by its respective price.
Assumption 2. Households possess two capital goods, kT (t) and kN (t). The income gained from
hiring out these capital goods to the companies is their unique source of private revenue. We thus
presume that there is no wage coming from labor services.
Assumption 2 will becomemore important whenwewill talk about the decentralized
economy. Let us now turn to the solution of the social planner’s problem.
2.2 Economic Equilibrium
The present value Hamiltonian, H(·), of the social planner is:
H(·) =
(
c (t)1−σ − 1
)
e−ρ t
1 − σ
+ µT (t)
(
AkT (t)
α kN (t)
1−α
− c (t) − ǫ ivN (t) − δ kT (t)
)
+ µN (t) (ivN (t) − δ kN (t))
(7)
The variables µT (t) and µN (t) are the costate variables. The first order conditions for
this problem are:
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The derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to consumption.
c (t)1−σ e−ρ t
c (t)
− µT (t) = 0 (8)
The derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to investment in the non-tradable
sector.
− µT (t) ǫ + µN (t) = 0 (9)
We take the derivative of the Hamiltonian with regard to the two state variables, set
the results equal to the negative of the derivative of the costate variables in each sector
relative to time and rearrange the equations to get.
µT (t)
(
AkT (t)
−1+α α kN (t)
1−α
− δ
)
= −
d
dt
µT (t) (10)
µT (t)AkT (t)
α kN (t)
−α (1 − α) − µN (t) δ = −
d
dt
µN (t) (11)
Combining equations (8) and (10), doing lots of algebra and oversimplifications, we
get:
d
dt c (t)
c (t)
=
AkT (t)
−1+α α kN (t)
1−α
− δ − ρ
σ
(12)
Similarly joining equalities (9), (10) and (11) performing more algebra and simplifi-
cations, we obtain:
kT (t) =
α kN (t) ǫ
1 − α
(13)
Substituting equation (13) in (12) and simplifying, we have:
d
dt c (t)
c (t)
=
1
σ
(
A
(
α ǫ
1 − α
)−1+α
α − δ − ρ
)
(14)
Before saying anything about this last equation, we need somemore assumptions that
we will have to derive. Firstly, solving the differential equation given in (14), we find:
c (t) = c (0) e
t
σ
(
A(− α ǫ−1+α )
−1+α
α−δ−ρ
)
(15)
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Assumption 3. In order to have positive endogenous consumption growth, we need
δ + ρ < A
(
−
α ǫ
−1 + α
)−1+α
α (16)
Secondly, the two transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞
µT (t) kT (t) = 0
lim
t→∞
µN (t) kN (t) = 0 (17)
Working through these expressions we get the following assumption.
Assumption 4. For the transversality conditions to hold, we need
δ < A
(
−
α ǫ
−1 + α
)−1+α
α (18)
After stating these hypotheses, now we discuss the following propositions.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the growth rate in equation (14) is function
of only the parameters of the model. Hence the growth rate is endogenous in the sense that it is
engendered from inside the system as a direct outcome of internal mechanisms.
The RER affects growth through the real interest rate.
Proof: See Appendix A for the proof of the second part of this Proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the RER acts on production through compound
total factor productivity.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, an RER appreciation (an increase in ǫ) reduces
the growth rate in the centralized economy. An appreciation diminishes the real interest rate
and pushes the agent to consume more today than tomorrow. This decreases saving and hence
decreases growth.
Proof: See Appendix C.
2.3 Taxes on Tradable and Non-Tradable Investments
Now we turn to the decentralized economy where we analyze the impacts of taxes on
tradable and non-tradable investments. We formulate first the problem for the tax on
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tradable investment.
The household’s budget constraint is:
c (t) + (1 + τT) ivT (t) + ǫ ivN (t) = rT (t) kT (t) + ǫ rN (t) kN (t) + T (t) (19)
In this equation, τT is the tax rate on tradable investment; rT (t) and rN (t) are the
net real interest rates in the tradable and non-tradable sectors respectively; T (t) is the
lump-sum government transfer.
The government budget constraint is given by:
T (t) = τTivT (t) (20)
The profits πfs (t) of the firm are:
πfs (t) = AkT (t)
α kN (t)
1−α
− rT (t) kT (t) − ǫ rN (t) kN (t) (21)
Now solving the household’s problem by maximizing the objective function (1)
subject to equations (2), (3), the initial capitals and (19); maximizing the firm’s profits
(equation (21)); taking into account the government’s budget constraint (20), and finally
allowing for general equilibrium, after many calculations, we obtain:
d
dt c (t)
c (t)
=
1
σ
 Aα
α
1 + τT
(
−
ǫ
(−1 + α) (1 + τT)
)−1+α
− δ − ρ
 (22)
This last equation provides the endogenous growth rate in the competitive equi-
librium when investment in tradables is taxed. We can now enunciate the following
propositions.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, the transversality and positive growth conditions, an
RER appreciation (an increase in ǫ) reduces the growth rate in the decentralized economy.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, the transversality and positive growth conditions, an
augmentation of the tax on tradable investment diminishes the growth rate in the decentralized
economy.
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Proof: See Appendix E.
Similarly, setting and solving the problem for the tax on non-tradable investment, we
find:
d
dt c (t)
c (t)
=
1
σ
Aαα
(
−
(1 + τN) ǫ
−1 + α
)−1+α
− δ − ρ
 (23)
This last equation gives the endogenous growth rate in the competitive equilibrium
when investment in non-tradables is taxed. We now state the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1, 2, the transversality and positive growth conditions, an
increase of the tax on non-tradable investment lowers the growth rate.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Having finished to present the theoretical part of the paper, now we turn to the
empirical part.
3 Empirical Investigations
This section presents the estimationmethods, the data and variables, and the econometric
results.
3.1 Estimation Methods
To empirically analyze the effect of real effective exchange rate (REER) misalignment on
growth, we estimate the following econometric model:
ln
(
gdpcapit
)
= ci + αimisalit + βi0∆misalit + θ
′
i xit + δ
′
i0∆xit
+ ωiyln
(
gdpcapt
)
+ ωi,m0misalt + ω
′
i,x0xt + eit
(24)
Where ln
(
gdpcapit
)
is the logarithm of real GDP per capita; misalit is REER misalign-
ment; xit is a set of control variables: logarithm of the human capital index, logarithm of
general government final consumption expenditures over GDP, logarithm of openness
(exports + imports over GDP), logarithm of terms of trade (exports prices over imports
prices), logarithm of investment over GDP, logarithm of 1 + the inflation rate, logarithm
of domestic credit to private sector over GDP (financial development), logarithm of tax
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revenue over GDP; a ∆ in front of a variable designates its first difference and a bar over
a variable indicates the cross-sectional (CS) average of that variable; eit is the error term; i
specifies the countries and t the time; all parameters are heterogeneous and the long-run
coefficients of interest are αi and θ
′
i
.
To estimate equation (24) we employ the Cross-Sectionally Augmented Distributed
Lag (CS-DL) Estimator developed by Chudik et al. (2013). This regression technique
takes into account nonstationarity, parameter heterogeneity, cross-section dependence
and dynamics. Since our data are annual data from 1980 to 2011, nonstationarity may be
of concern. Numerous studies show that some moderate undervaluation have a positive
impact on growth, especially for developing countries while high undervaluations and
large overvaluationsmay harmgrowth in some other countries. This put forward that the
impacts ofmisalignment on growth differs across countries according to their institutions
and particularities. It is thus crucial to consider heterogeneity in countries. As pointed
out by Chudik et al. (2013), conditioning only on country-specific-variables does not
guaranty cross-sectional error independence because there could be omitted common
factors, probably associated with the independent variables, which affect these countries.
Not considering these linkages could result to biased estimated coefficients. Wemust also
think about the dynamics of the regressed equations. The CS-DL Estimator addresses
all the issues raised previously and allows us to estimate the long-run effects of REER
misalignment on growth. These are the first set of reasons why we use this estimator in
this paper. Additionally, our theoretical model is of AK type. This implies that the model
does not have transitional dynamics and that per capita growth rates are independent
of the initial levels of capital and output per capita. Hence there is no conditional
convergence in our model. This is the theoretical explanation why we do not include the
initial value of GDP per capita in our regressions. Likewise the empirical model does
not explicitly allow the introduction of the lagged value of the dependent variable in
the estimations and in the computation of the long-run coefficients these dynamics are
already accounted for, see Chudik et al. (2013). The AK framework also means that at the
steady-state all variables grow at the same rate. But the expression of the growth rate in
(14) implies that the corresponding levels of the variables in our model are nonstationary.
Moreover, econometrics theory suggest that cointegration is the method that we should
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use to estimate relationships between nonstationary variables. These are the second set
of reasons why we employ the CS-DL Estimator is this research.
Note that since we have lots of regressors in the above equation with possibly some
missing values, we could not include more lags of the regressors because, for the above
estimation to work, the size of the matrices used internally by the estimator must be at
least as large as the number of panels in the estimation sample. Hencewe decided to stick
to a reasonable, feasible and tractable specification. But to test the robustness of our main
results, we estimate again this equation by including only ln
(
gdpcapit
)
and misalit taking
into account more lags of the REER misalignment variable and its transformations. We
have:
ln
(
gdpcapit
)
= ci + αimisalit + βi0∆misalit
+ ωiyln
(
gdpcapt
)
+ ωi,m0misalt + ωi,m1misalt−1
+ ωi,m2misalt−2 + ωi,m3misalt−3 + eit
(25)
Where all the variables are as defined in equation (24).
Before calculating the REER misalignment, we first compute the equilibrium real
effective exchange rate (EREER). The economic literature on exchange rate states that
REER is affected by its determinants called “fundamentals” (Williamson (1994), Edwards
(1998)). We use the Pesaran and Smith (1995) standard Mean Group (MG) method
to estimate the relationship between the REER and its fundamentals. The estimated
equation is:
ln (reerit) = β1,i ln
(
prodit
)
+ β2,i ln
(
openit
)
+ β3,i ln
(
gconsit
)
+ β4,infait + β5,i ln (totit) + uit
(26)
With ln (reerit) is the logarithm of REER where the ponderations are measured as
(Imports + Exports) without oil countries; ln
(
prodit
)
is the logarithm of total factor pro-
ductivity at constant national prices, a proxy for the Balassa-Samuelson effect; ln
(
openit
)
represents the logarithm of openness, (exports + imports) over GDP; ln
(
gconsit
)
is the
logarithm of general government final consumption expenditures over GDP; nfait con-
stitutes net foreign assets over GDP; ln (totit) is the logarithm of terms of trade (exports
prices over imports prices); uit represents the unobservables which are function of group
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fixed effects and some white noise terms; the regressors in (26) are also function of some
other group fixed effects and white noise terms. In equation (26), all parameters are
expected to be positive, except the one for openness which is supposed to be negative.
The parameters are also heterogeneous. After estimating equation (26), we multiply
each parameter βi by the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott filtered
2 fundamental given
above. This result gives us the equilibrium REER (EREER). The REER misalignment is
then computed according to the following formula:
misalit =
ln (reerit)
ereerit
− 1 (27)
In this last equation, a positive value of misalit represents an overvaluation.
3.2 Data and Variables
We need adequate time periods to estimate the parameters in our econometric models
because our study permits slope heterogeneity through countries. Therefore we take
account of only countries that have at least 30 successive years of observations. Similarly,
we need a good number of countries to control for error cross-sectional dependence.
Thus, the minimum number of countries is taken to be 17. Additionally, since we use the
Hodrick-Prescott filter in the computation of REER misalignment, we need a balanced
panel data. To satisfy all of these requirements we finished up with a sample of study
that contains 37 countries 3: 18 developed and 19 developing countries. We employ
annual data from 1980 to 2011. The data essentially come from the World Bank (World
Development Indicators, 2014), Centre d’E´tudes et de Recherches sur le De´veloppement
International (CERDI, 2013) and the Penn World Tables 8.0. The REER is computed in
foreign-currency terms meaning that an increase of the REER indicates an appreciation
and, hence a potential loss of competitiveness. This way of formulating the REER allows
us to be consistent through both of our theoretical and empirical models.
Before estimating the equilibrium real effective exchange rate (EREER), we run unit
root tests on the REER and its fundamentals. Table 1 gives the results of the unit root tests
for the variables expressed in level. In all tests, except the Hadri test, the null hypothesis
2The long-term trend.
3Except the regressions involving Tax Revenues which contain lots of missing values.
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is that the panels contain unit roots 4, and the alternative is that the panels are stationary 5.
For the Hadri test, the null hypothesis is that all panels are stationary and the alternative
is that some panels contain unit roots. The Levin, Lin and Chu, Harris-Tzavalis and the
Breitung tests make the simplifying assumption that the panels are homogenous while
the other tests assume that the panels are heterogeneous. We see that for each variable
listed in Table 1, there exist at least one test that says that the variable may contain a unit
root. Moreover Table 2 illustrates that these variables are potentially I(1). This last result
leads us to the issue of cointegration among these variables. This is why we perform
cointegration tests between the REER and its fundamentals in Table 3. Hence Table 3
exhibits Pedroni’s panel cointegration tests. In these tests, the first four present thewithin
dimension while the others give the between dimension. Under the null hypothesis of
no cointegration, all tests follow a N(0, 1) distribution. Here we also see that there exist
at least one test that demonstrates that the estimated equations between the REER and
its fundamentals are cointegrated.
Table 4 gives the estimations results of the EREER. This table shows that all param-
eters have the expected signs and nearly all of them are statistically significant. Total
Factor Productivity takes into account the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Its coefficient is pos-
itive meaning that an increase in productivity augments the REER. This is the Balassa-
Samuelson phenomenon which states that productivity augments faster in the tradable
than in the non-tradable sector. This rises wages in the tradable sector and hence wages
in the non-tradable sector. This in turn causes an increase in domestic inflation and an
appreciation of the REER. Openness have a negative impact on REER. In fact, restricted
trade applies a downward pressure on the price of tradables relative to non-tradables,
thus causing an REER appreciation. Government consumption have a positive effect
on REER. Indeed, higher government demand for non-tradable goods augments their
relative price instigating an appreciation of the REER. Net foreign assets exert a positive
effect on the REER. In reality, an increase in net foreign assets induces an amelioration of
the current account. Terms of trade act positively on REER. Literally, if the income effect
take over the substitution effect, an increase in terms of trade enhances the trade balance.
After estimating the parameters in Table 4, we compute the EREER and the REER Mis-
4Or all panels contain unit roots depending on the nature of the test.
5Or some/at least one panels are/is stationary depending on the nature of the test.
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alignment according to the techniques described in subsection 3.1. The resulting REER
Misalignment variables are then labeled REER Misalignment 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the same
order as the equations in Table 4.
3.3 Econometric Results
In this part, we will present the main estimation results and the robustness analysis.
3.3.1 Main Estimation Results
Table 5 gives the estimation results of the relationship between REER misalignment and
growth using the CS-DL estimator for all countries. All nine equations show that REER
misalignment is statistically significant at all conventional levels and have the expected
sign. This implies that an augmentation of REER misalignment reduces the growth rate.
The aforementioned results, empirically corroborate what we have found theoretically
in Propositions 3 and 4. In particular, this means that REER overvaluation decreases
the real interest rate and pushes the agents to consume more today than tomorrow
causing saving to decline and hence growth to diminish. Our econometric outcomes
were also found by Sallenave (2010) and Elbadawi et al. (2012). Our findings illustrate
that, the negative effect of REER misalignment on growth is robust to the introduction
of different control variables. In fact, through the nine equations we have varied the
introduction of the control variables but the coefficient of REER misalignment retains its
expected sign and is always statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect of REER
misalignment on growth is very high. Referring to regression (1), a change in REER
misalignment by one standard deviation reduces the growth rate by 88.18%. This is a
very high value, suggesting that REER misalignment has a huge damaging impact on
growth. We observe that the standard errors of the coefficients of REER misalignment
are relatively small. This implies that the corresponding confidence intervals, though not
reported, are tinier meaning that the coefficients of REER misalignment are estimated
with great precision. The number of observations and the number of countries are
approximately stable in all nine equations, hence our panel is satisfactorily balanced
and the phenomenon we are studying covers most of our sample. The results also
highlight that growth is negatively influenced by government consumption and inflation.
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Investment, terms of trade, financial development and openness act positively on growth.
Here also, these outcomes concerning the control variableswere foundbymany empirical
growth studies.
In Table 6 we incorporate the effect of taxes in our CS-DL estimations. Firstly, we
notice that the number of observations is lower compared to ourmain regressions. This is
because the variable tax revenue have lots ofmissing values 6. Howeverwe are left with a
good number of observations onwhichwe can conduct statistical inference. Secondly, we
use tax revenue as a proxy of taxes on tradable and non-tradable investments since theses
latter two measurements are very hard to obtain. Referring to equation (3) and taking
the logarithm of the tax revenue variable at its mean, a change of REER misalignment
equivalent to one standard deviation, reduces the growth rate by 146.36%. This is 1.66
times the effect of REER misalignment that we found in our main growth regressions.
We deduce that the negative impact of REER misalignment on growth is exacerbated
when the economy is taxed. That is, the more we increase taxes, the more the growth rate
is hindered by REER misalignment. Taxes taken alone have also a damaging effect on
growth. As depicted by equation (2), an increase in taxes by 1% diminishes the growth
rate by 0.371%. This last result roughly corroborates what we found theoretically in
Propositions 5 and 6. The results also illustrate that human capital and investment act
positively on growth.
In Table 7, we take into account the possibility of a non-linear effect of REER mis-
alignment on growth. All nine equations show that REER misalignment and its square
are negative and statistically significant. Here also, our two variables of interest are
robust to the introduction of control variables because we have mixed the introduction
of control variables but the coefficients of REER misalignment and its square keep their
signs and continue to be significant in all equations. The results demonstrate that not
only small values of REER misalignment hinder growth but also large values have even
more damaging impact on growth. Based on equation (8), if we start from the mean of
REER misalignment and assume a change of this variable equivalent to one standard
deviation, from this point, we see the growth rate declining by 165.03%. This is 1.87 times
the effect of REER misalignment that we found in our main regressions. Hence it is a
6We could not obtain a tax revenue variable which contains less missing values.
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huge fall. The number of observations and the number of countries are approximately
the same as in our main regressions. Inflation and government consumption continue
to have negative effects on growth while openness, investment and terms of trade affect
growth positively.
3.3.2 Robustness Analysis
The results in Table 8 illustrate that REERmisalignment acts negatively and significantly
on growth in the developed countries. As in the main estimations, we observe that the
effect of REER misalignment is very large. The number of observations and the number
of countries nearly represent the half of those we have in the main regressions. Hence
they are fairly reasonable and we have a good representative subsample. As in the main
regressions, government consumption and inflation affect growth negatively whereas
openness has a positive impact on growth. The results we found in the main estimations
are thus maintained for the developed countries.
Table 9 presents the results of the estimations for the developing countries. Similarly
to the previous regressions, REERmisalignment influences negatively economic growth.
As in the main estimations, the effect of REER misalignment is very high. Consequently
REER misalignment is very harmful to developing countries. The coefficients of REER
misalignment are roughly stable in all nine equations. As for the developed countries,
the number of observations and the number of countries are fairly reasonable. Also iden-
tically to the advanced economies, the results for the developing countries corroborates
those found in our main regressions. Inflation and government consumption continue
to have a negative impact on growth while openness, financial development, terms of
trade, investment and human capital positively affect growth.
In Table 10, we provide the estimation results using the alternative measures of REER
misalignment. We have taken equation (5) of themain results in Table 5 and included one
by one the alternative measurements of REERmisalignment calculated from Table 4. We
see that all the three misalignment variables affect negatively and significantly economic
growth. As in the main results, the effect of REER misalignment is very high and is
approximately similar to its magnitude in equation (5) of Table 5. The standard errors
of the coefficients of REER misalignment are relatively small, suggesting a high degree
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of precision in the estimation of the coefficients. Also these coefficients remain stable
across all three equations. The number of observations and the number of countries are
comparable to the ones we have in the main regressions. All the control variables are
statistically significant and have the expected signs. The results found here suggest that
changing the way the REERmisalignment is computed does not alter the conclusions we
found in our main estimations.
The results in Table 11 exhibit the estimations of the effect of misalignment on growth
when we consider more lags of REER misalignment and its transformations. We see
that REER misalignment continue to have a negative and significant impact on growth.
The magnitude of the effect of REER misalignment is still large but is slightly smaller
than those of most of the coefficients we found in our main regressions. Here also the
results show that even after controlling for more lags of REER misalignment and its
transformations 7, the conclusions of our main results do not globally change.
7i.e. more dynamics.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between RER and economic growth both theoret-
ically and empirically. The theoretical part shows that RER appreciation hinders the
growth rate in the centralized and competitive economies. Taxes have also a negative
impact on growth. Using new developments on nonstationary heterogeneous dynamic
cross-section dependent panel data techniques, we find that REER misalignment has a
strong negative impact on growth. A change in REERmisalignment by one standard de-
viation reduces the growth rate by 88.18%. Furthermore, very large misalignments have
more damaging effects on growth. The robustness checks illustrates that the negative
impact of REERmisalignment on growth is stable to the use of alternative measurements
of REER misalignment and on subsamples of developed and developing countries.
Though the results found were informative, some extensions could be made. If data
on both taxes on tradable and non-tradable investments were available, some regressions
on these two variables would allow us to test more precisely Propositions 5 and 6. Some
studies of threshold effects in the context of the CS-DL Estimator could also provide help-
ful information on the nonlinear impact of REER misalignment on growth. Concerning
the theoretical model, a three-good approach of RER could also give us more insights on
how the RER affect growth. These avenues of research are left for our future studies.
From economic policy perspectives, the results illustrate that RER mismanagements,
in particular REERmisalignment could have negative impacts on growth and that efforts
made to reduce them might relaunch saving, investment and growth.
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A Proof of the second part of Proposition 1
The profits are given by:
πfs (t) = AkT (t)
α kN (t)
1−α
− RT (t) kT (t) − ǫRN (t) kN (t)
Where RT (t) and RN (t) are the gross interest rates in each sector. Maximizing profits
with respect to kT (t), we get:
RT (t) = AkT (t)
−1+α α kN (t)
1−α
Now combining this last equation with (13) and taking account of the fact that
rT (t) = RT (t) − δ, and performing some algebra, we have:
rT (t) = A
(
α ǫ
1 − α
)−1+α
α − δ

B Proof of Proposition 2
Combining the production function (4) and equation (13) and doing some algebra, we
get:
y (t) = A
(
α ǫ
1 − α
)−1+α
kT (t)
y (t) = A
(
α ǫ
1 − α
)α
kN (t)

C Proof of Proposition 3
We set γ =
d
dt c(t)
c(t) and calculate:
∂
∂ǫ
γ =
A (−1 + α)α
σ ǫ
(
α ǫ
1 − α
)−1+α
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In this last equation, since α < 1, the expression −1 + α is negative and all the other
expressions are positive. Hence ∂∂ǫγ < 0.

D Proof of Proposition 4
We set γ =
d
dt c(t)
c(t) and calculate:
∂
∂ǫ
γ =
Aαα (−1 + α)
ǫ (1 + τT) σ
(
−
ǫ
(−1 + α) (1 + τT)
)−1+α
In this last equation, since α < 1, the expression −1 + α is negative and all the other
expressions are positive. Hence ∂∂ǫγ < 0.

E Proof of Proposition 5
We set γ =
d
dt c(t)
c(t) and calculate:
∂
∂τT
γ = −
Aααα
(1 + τT)
2 σ
(
−
ǫ
(−1 + α) (1 + τT)
)−1+α
The right hand side of this equality is negative because it is preceded by a minus sign
and all of its remaining compound expressions are positive. Hence ∂∂τTγ < 0.

F Proof of Proposition 6
Going through the same process as for the Proof of Proposition 5, we get ∂∂τN γ < 0.

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G Tables of the Empirical Investigations
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests of the Variables in Level
Variables Levin-Lin-Chu Harris-Tzavalis Breitung Im-Pesaran-Shin Fisher-Type Tests Hadri
REER -3.9629 0.8543 -0.0684 -1.5183 118.3441 55.5482
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.4727) (0.0645) (0.0008) (0.0000)
Total Factor Productivity -5.6022 0.9332 5.2792 -1.3780 148.8802 91.0492
(0.0000) (0.9389) (1.0000) (0.0841) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Terms of Trade -2.5352 0.8740 -0.2233 0.6144 88.5872 60.6851
(0.0056) (0.0123) (0.4117) (0.7305) (0.1186) (0.0000)
Openness 0.0065 0.9187 0.4807 2.6087 61.6831 79.8804
(0.5026) (0.7302) (0.6847) (0.9955) (0.8459) (0.0000)
Government Consumption -3.8060 0.8801 0.0206 -1.1689 123.8603 56.7384
(0.0001) (0.0316) (0.5082) (0.1212) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Net Foreign Assets -0.1374 0.8857 2.1116 4.7880 65.9136 81.4858
(0.4454) (0.0674) (0.9826) (1.0000) (0.7374) (0.0000)
The p-values are in parenthesis.
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests of the Variables in First Difference
Variables Levin-Lin-Chu Harris-Tzavalis Breitung Im-Pesaran-Shin Fisher-Type Tests Hadri
REER -12.6202 0.0972 -10.8334 -15.9943 468.1702 1.1581
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1234)
Total Factor Productivity -12.7148 0.2087 -11.3859 -14.4296 445.5769 7.3797
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Terms of Trade -14.7917 -0.0486 -12.4507 -17.8681 582.9731 0.6326
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2635)
Openness -15.7832 0.0064 -14.1022 -17.8504 529.7298 -1.0225
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8467)
Government Consumption -13.7062 0.0845 -12.5530 -16.3653 476.5463 0.5167
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3027)
Net Foreign Assets -8.5072 -0.3011 -13.3788 -16.4452 414.2475 -2.9369
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9983)
The p-values are in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Pedroni Panel Data Cointegration Tests (all test statistics are distributed N(0, 1),
under a null of no cointegration, and diverge to negative infinity, save for panel v)
Pedroni Panel Cointegration Tests (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel Cointegration Tests
panel v-stat -0.4265 -0.7258 -0.7237 -1.0400
panel rho-stat 1.0270 2.0350 1.3870 2.4490
panel t-stat -0.2811 -0.0348 -1.0770 -0.7612
panel adf-stat 1.9410 2.0720 1.1130 1.8430
Group Mean Cointegration Tests
group rho-stat 2.7310 4.0840 2.5160 3.9980
group t-stat 0.3130 0.7332 -1.7010 -1.2390
group adf-stat 2.2650 3.1320 0.9579 2.3270
Table 4: Estimation of the Equilibrium Real Effective Exchange Rate (EREER)
Dependent Variable: Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Factor Productivity 0.441** 0.490*** 0.475*** 0.550***
(0.210) (0.168) (0.169) (0.126)
Openness -0.295*** -0.365*** -0.344*** -0.354***
(0.0601) (0.0570) (0.0558) (0.0475)
Government Consumption 0.293** 0.336*** 0.361*** 0.385***
(0.131) (0.114) (0.0987) (0.0963)
Net Foreign Assets 0.318* 0.179
(0.183) (0.156)
Terms of Trade 0.289** 0.289**
(0.139) (0.132)
Constant 0.555** 0.527** 0.642*** 0.650***
(0.270) (0.260) (0.206) (0.209)
Observations 1,184 1,184 1,184 1,184
Number of Countries 37 37 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 5: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator for all Countries
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
REER Misalignment 4 -0.0868*** -0.0446** -0.0822*** -0.0508* -0.0642** -0.0698** -0.0509* -0.0657** -0.0556*
(0.0303) (0.0221) (0.0273) (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0334) (0.0293) (0.0308) (0.0299)
Government Consumption -0.327*** -0.169*** -0.321*** -0.279*** -0.243*** -0.185*** -0.230*** -0.170***
(0.0928) (0.0549) (0.0699) (0.0673) (0.0594) (0.0525) (0.0631) (0.0650)
Inflation -0.250* -0.0334 -0.00213 -0.00295
(0.138) (0.135) (0.103) (0.120)
Investment 0.247*** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.225***
(0.0328) (0.0289) (0.0303) (0.0337) (0.0322)
Terms of Trade 0.209** 0.221** 0.242*** 0.272** 0.187** 0.292*** 0.198**
(0.0965) (0.0995) (0.0906) (0.126) (0.0906) (0.105) (0.0982)
Financial Development 0.0599* 0.0637*** 0.00739 0.00112
(0.0306) (0.0231) (0.0318) (0.0368)
Openness 0.0909*
(0.0545)
Constant -1.119 -0.847 -0.828 -0.290 -0.931 0.511 -1.069 -1.057 -0.671
(1.149) (1.159) (1.097) (1.145) (1.240) (1.632) (1.230) (1.382) (1.269)
Observations 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,124 1,147 1,124 1,124 1,147 1,124
Number of Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator Taking Taxes into
Account
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
REER Misalignment 4 -2.820** -0.153* -2.828*
(1.376) (0.0796) (1.546)
Tax Revenue -1.403* -0.371*** -1.635*
(0.846) (0.109) (0.848)
REER Misalignment 4 * Tax Revenue -1.532* -1.471*
(0.906) (0.854)
Human Capital Index 3.692* 6.508*
(1.965) (3.324)
Investment 0.191***
(0.0553)
Financial Development -0.0536
(0.0521)
Government Consumption -0.137
(0.217)
Constant 1.506 -0.635 1.576
(2.358) (1.829) (4.386)
Observations 397 317 206
Number of Countries 22 17 10
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 7: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator: Considering Nonlinearity
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
REER Misalignment 4 -1.009* -0.820* -0.423** -0.644** -0.414* -0.306** -0.470* -0.491** -0.336*
(0.586) (0.495) (0.178) (0.295) (0.217) (0.148) (0.258) (0.230) (0.173)
REER Misalignment 4 Squared -0.445* -0.383* -0.202** -0.300** -0.187* -0.120* -0.231* -0.200* -0.132*
(0.262) (0.232) (0.0837) (0.147) (0.0978) (0.0690) (0.130) (0.103) (0.0750)
Openness 0.128 0.0310 -0.0223 -0.0240 0.0388 0.00756 0.0237 0.0852*
(0.0857) (0.0719) (0.0550) (0.0614) (0.0568) (0.0555) (0.0684) (0.0499)
Inflation -0.306* 0.119 -0.328*** -0.231*** -0.295*
(0.165) (0.126) (0.102) (0.0837) (0.169)
Government Consumption -0.262*** -0.196*** -0.342*** -0.133 -0.194*** -0.146** -0.126 -0.225***
(0.0752) (0.0682) (0.0645) (0.0890) (0.0648) (0.0625) (0.0898) (0.0809)
Investment 0.196*** 0.223*** 0.191*** 0.205*** 0.221***
(0.0298) (0.0348) (0.0287) (0.0298) (0.0321)
Human Capital Index -0.961 -0.832 0.243
(0.835) (0.557) (0.764)
Terms of Trade 0.168** 0.0725
(0.0766) (0.0861)
Financial Development -0.0198
(0.0344)
Constant -0.798 -2.664 -0.826 1.261 0.433 -0.155 1.042 0.473 2.051
(1.676) (1.658) (1.147) (0.972) (1.303) (1.245) (1.370) (1.304) (1.510)
Observations 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,124
Number of Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 8: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator for the Developed
Countries
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
REER Misalignment 4 -0.0761** -0.0780* -0.0874** -0.116*
(0.0341) (0.0414) (0.0422) (0.0628)
Human Capital Index -0.900
(0.822)
Government Consumption -0.270** -0.247*** -0.223*** -0.317***
(0.107) (0.0938) (0.0857) (0.113)
Openness 0.161*
(0.0905)
Terms of Trade 0.0179 -0.109
(0.139) (0.198)
Inflation -0.273* -0.276* -0.0985
(0.158) (0.144) (0.215)
Financial Development -0.0509
(0.0331)
Constant 0.221 0.477 0.587 0.554
(1.026) (1.166) (1.739) (1.703)
Observations 558 558 543 558
Number of Countries 18 18 18 18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 9: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator for the Developing Countries
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
REER Misalignment 4 -0.0668* -0.135*** -0.0704** -0.0973*** -0.0688* -0.0688* -0.0629** -0.0479* -0.0712**
(0.0360) (0.0476) (0.0333) (0.0360) (0.0401) (0.0357) (0.0320) (0.0281) (0.0340)
Openness 0.118 0.258*** 0.0948* 0.119** 0.128* 0.102** 0.0586 0.101**
(0.0717) (0.0954) (0.0575) (0.0543) (0.0698) (0.0518) (0.0369) (0.0452)
Inflation -0.160* -0.217* -0.129 -0.181 -0.0804 -0.175
(0.0907) (0.119) (0.127) (0.166) (0.0759) (0.188)
Financial Development 0.109*** 0.118*** 0.120***
(0.0382) (0.0430) (0.0376)
Terms of Trade 0.0778 0.107* -0.0191 0.151*** 0.149** 0.0823* 0.142**
(0.0831) (0.0546) (0.0572) (0.0512) (0.0585) (0.0447) (0.0583)
Government Consumption -0.0497 -0.0533 -0.119* -0.0897
(0.0614) (0.0843) (0.0637) (0.0678)
Investment 0.180*** 0.165*** 0.159*** 0.163***
(0.0540) (0.0385) (0.0257) (0.0474)
Human Capital Index 1.926*
(1.029)
Constant 0.363 0.00468 0.677 -0.752 -0.103 0.321 -0.268 0.799 0.318
(1.251) (1.408) (1.199) (1.559) (1.158) (1.449) (1.391) (1.404) (1.345)
Observations 581 589 581 589 581 589 589 589 589
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 10: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator with Alternative
Measures of REER Misalignment
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
Government Consumption -0.218*** -0.238*** -0.207***
(0.0570) (0.0558) (0.0559)
Investment 0.222*** 0.215*** 0.214***
(0.0267) (0.0279) (0.0269)
Terms of Trade 0.237*** 0.243*** 0.222**
(0.0908) (0.0880) (0.0930)
REER Misalignment 1 -0.0445**
(0.0222)
REER Misalignment 2 -0.0569**
(0.0228)
REER Misalignment 3 -0.0616**
(0.0270)
Constant -0.860 -1.110 -0.800
(1.209) (1.251) (1.224)
Observations 1,147 1,147 1,147
Number of Countries 37 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 11: Estimation of the Long-Run Effects Using the CS-DL Estimator Considering More
Lags of REER Misalignment and its Transformations
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita
Regressors (1)
REER Misalignment 4 -0.0490*
(0.0288)
Constant -0.284
(0.997)
Observations 1,073
Number of Countries 37
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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